

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

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10	GC				
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16	D/OEA/DI		X		
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SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks The attached purports to be the post-CPPG mat'l on Philippines to be considered at 10/4 NSPG. This has not come from NSC; rather, it was sent by State to C/EA/DO (that's why they're not on distribution). D/OEA may want to check with Childress to confirm. This can be used in preparing for NSPG pending receipt of papers from NSC.

STAT


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Date



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



October 1, 1985

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MEMORANDUM

TO: NSC - Dick Childress  
CIA -   
DOD - Rich Armitage

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FROM: EAP/PHL - John Maisto *JM*

SUBJECT: The September 27 CPPG -- Tasking Items

Per instructions from Paul and John Monjo, and in coordination with Dick Childress, attached please find these items discussed at the September 27 CPPG.

- The redrafted Presidential letter
- New talking point themes (with inclusion of two additional ticks)
- Suggested press guidance

All three items will be taken up at the October 4 NSPG.

Attachments:  
As Stated

cc: P - Ambassador Armacost  
EAP - Paul Wolfowitz  
EAP - John Monjo

*10:30 Friday*  
*Plan: WH Situation Room*  
*West Wing*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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PROPOSED DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER

Dear Ferdinand,

I have asked Senator Paul Laxalt to travel to Manila in order to share personally with you my deep concern about the trends and problems we perceive in the Philippines. It is because of our long friendship and my personal esteem for you that I chose Paul to undertake this mission for me. As you know, Paul has been one of my closest friends and most trusted personal advisors since I entered public life. Some of these matters have already been discussed by Ambassador Bosworth, but I think further dialogue could be useful to both of us.

I am frankly alarmed by the growing communist insurgency and the way it has been able to capitalize on the Philippines' current political, economic, and military difficulties. Without a dramatically improved effort, I fear we could be facing an eventual communist victory in the Philippines. And without such an effort we will not be able to gain and hold the support of the Congress and the American public for our Philippine programs.

Paul is one of my very trusted supporters in the Senate and a most experienced political hand in our party. He can explain the difficulties our programs will be facing in Congress. With my full confidence, he will further share my views and concerns with you.

Warmest regards,

Ronald Reagan

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Themes for Meeting of Presidential Envoy  
with President Marcos

President Reagan's Approach

--The President considers President Marcos an old friend. As important, President Reagan esteems President Marcos' as a leader, and he has admired President Marcos' political acumen over the years.

--The Philippines is a close friend and old ally of the United States. President Reagan's administration is faithful to its allies, stands by its friends, and does not abandon them when they are in painful situations. Some recent examples: President Reagan's support for Helmut Kohl over Bitburg and for the South African Government at present.

--At the same time, the adverse trends in the Philippines are personally very worrisome to the President. These trends are also generating increasing controversy in the Congress in a broad, bipartisan fashion, and among the American public.

--Although there are political costs (such as there were in the Bitburg issue and are in the South African situation) the President is prepared to stand by old friends.

--However, friends need to reciprocate and stand by President Reagan as well. This of course often involves tough political decisions.

--Our support of President Marcos is tied to our expectation that Marcos will do whatever is necessary to deal most effectively with the Philippines' very serious problems.

Importance/Objective of Visit

--This visit is reflection of President Reagan's deep concern over an alarming situation: the growing communist insurgency and the way it has been able to capitalize on the Philippines current political, economic, and military difficulties.

--We want to share our concerns frankly. Candor is most important at this time of unprecedented danger for the Philippines.

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--(as necessary) I will not enter into a debate about political facts, constitutional questions, or politico-legal themes. It would be utter folly to debate any of this with the most renowned Philippine lawyer and political leader of his generation. That is not my mission.

--(as necessary) I would hope that you will be as forthright with me as I will be with you. I would be disappointed, and so would the President, if your response to what I have to say is that "you Americans simply do not understand" and that "all is essentially well in the Philippines." Our information from all sources over time simply does not bear out such analysis.

### The Basic U.S. Message

--There are real U.S. interests at stake in the Philippines, particularly political and strategic. We have an obligation to you and to ourselves to bring our frank views to your attention.

--We are deeply concerned about stability in the Philippines and the ability of the Marcos government to deal with its interlocking political, economic, military, and insurgency problems

--What has been done so far to turn the situation around has not been adequate.

--In our view only a dramatic break with the past will surmount the present deep problems. We are prepared to enter an active dialogue with you to determine how the United States can help.

--Ambassador Bosworth and others (Armacost, Wolfowitz, Armitage) have spoken often to you of our views on importance of reforms to address all these problems, which are the underlying causes of the insurgency. Our specific concerns are as follows:

### The Growing Insurgency

--Best USG analysis: If present trends continue, within next three to five years insurgents could stalemate the military in countryside and bring urban terrorism to streets of Manila.

--Communist insurgency feeds on low popular support for Marcos Government; less than meaningful prospects for political reform; slow economic recovery, particularly in countryside; inept and even counterproductive military response to the insurgents; military abuses against civilians.

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The Inadequate Military Response

--Our analysis: the AFP is largely combat ineffective, suffering from severe deficiencies in leadership, training, tactics, transportation, communications, and logistics. Lack of discipline has led to abuses against the civilian population.

--Recent steps aimed at restoring AFP capabilities are encouraging, but much more needs to be done.

--Credible, professional military leadership at the top -- the Chief of Staff level -- is absolutely essential to turn the insurgency around.

The Political Problem: A Crisis of Confidence

--The next elections will be a crucial test of the ability of Filipinos to resolve their political problems peacefully through the ballot.

--Sufficient guarantees are needed to convince Filipinos and the world community that the Marcos Government is acting in good faith on elections: a fair electoral law; a balanced election commission; a trustworthy citizens' election watchdog organization; opposition access to all the media; assurance that Philippine military will not participate.

The Stagnating Economy

--Key to economic stability is adherence to IMF program. Marcos government to be commended for progress thus far.

--Main problem continues to be government interference in the economy, particularly in agriculture, and most pressing, in the sugar and coconut areas. Reagan Administration views about free market economies in developing countries need no elaboration.

--Badly needed new investment, domestic and foreign, will not be forthcoming until the political situation clarifies: questions of political stability and strong/creative leadership; whether groundwork is being laid for a successful political transition. Without change, we see continued economic stagnation ahead.

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The Congressional Aspect

--The Administration's ability to obtain sufficient security assistance from the Congress is contingent upon progress in reform.

--Congressional agreement to authorize the military assistance component of security assistance for FY 86 was achieved only by all out Administration effort.

--In particular, absent resolution of the AFP leadership problems and demonstrable progress on military reform, we are convinced that even that level of effort will not again be successful. This has been confirmed repeatedly by sympathetic Congressional leaders.

Contingency Talking Point: The U.S. Military Facilities (if raised by Marcos)

--Because of the communist insurgency advance we see as possible the loss of the U.S. military facilities in the Philippines. For the good of the Philippines, the entire region, and the United States, we do not want to see this happen. None of us can permit an additional communist military presence in the Asia/Pacific region.

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CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE

Philippines: Presidential Emissary

-- We have had over the years and continue to have an ongoing dialogue with the Philippine leadership.

-- As befits friends and allies of long standing, this dialogue is cordial and mutually beneficial.

-- As is customary, we will not comment on the substance of our diplomatic exchanges.

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